

# BRITISH RADICALS KNOWLEDGE OF, AND ATTITUDES TO RUSSIA 1900–1914

## PART II THE ORIGINS AND EFFECTS OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE, 1907

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A previous article was written about non-governmental British Radicals knowledge of, and attitudes to the autocratic nature of government in Russia during the early years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century preceding the 1914–1918 war. The reaction of the Radicals to improving Anglo-Russian political relations is the subject of this article. The attempt in both articles is to try and identify who British Radicals were where possible, and what they were able to know about the Russian Empire between about 1900 and 1914.<sup>1</sup>

### INTRODUCTION

By 1900, Britain had declined relative to the other Great Powers, and the glaring exposure of that fact was seen in the Boer conflict. Sir Edward Clarke wrote:

In order to deal with a small body of persons we are obliged to call out the Reserves and the Militia, to send out an Army Corps, to draw troops from India, to accept contributions of troops from our great Colonies, and to make such an effort for the purpose of this war as makes one wonder what the country would have to do if we were engaged in war with a great power, ...<sup>2</sup>

As the European Powers watched in glee as Britain struggled in South Africa, it became apparent to the British government that British military resources had become grossly overstretched.

### (I)

In 'The South African Affair' written by Felix Volkhovsky for *Free Russia*, he outlined the economic imperatives behind further Russian expansion. He also indicated the opportunity for Russia, aided by France and abetted by Germany, to take advantage of Britain's embarrassment.<sup>3</sup> In the January 1900 issue, Russian sympathies with the Boers were clearly expressed. The

journal portrayed all classes as being in opposition to Britain. While ‘... the reactionary papers take the side of the Boers on the ground of Russian jingoistic rivalry with Great Britain, ... [others who] ... have been so long accustomed to look to the British nation as the champion of freedom and self-government for everybody ... never expected the darker elements ... to be so powerful, as, to their minds, the fact of the Transvaal war has proved.’<sup>4</sup> The article ‘South African Items,’ proceeded to mention the raising of money in Russia for the Boers, and also people making inquiries about enlisting as volunteers to fight against the British. Not surprisingly, *Free Russia* received replies to the article. Consequently Robert Spence Watson, the Honorary Treasurer, on the front page of the February 1900 issue, answered those criticisms by claiming that the Paper’s purpose was not to analyse the rights or wrongs of the war but that ‘... the very object of the paper and of the Society is to let us in England know more clearly what the people in Russia are thinking, and what is being done in that country socially and politically.’ He proceeded to repeat the knowledge of there being widespread interest in Russia in the South African war ‘... and that people of all classes and of antagonistic views take the side of the Boers, and do so because they hold that we have shown neither generosity nor love of freedom in the matter.’<sup>5</sup> Spence Watson then quoted Gladstone in support of his argument. About two-and-a-half years later, when the war was over, Felix Volkhovsky opened the July 1902 issue by admitting that the South African peace terms, as well as Edward VII’s coronation and his illness had overshadowed news from Russia in the British press.<sup>6</sup>

These observations from *Free Russia* are of interest, because this was a journal read by Radicals and one for which they sometimes wrote. It found their favour, and it is fair to say that, even if the facts were in anyway questionable, some of those ideas expressed above, were in keeping with those held by Henry Campbell-Bannerman, David Lloyd George and other Liberal politicians of like-mind.

The fundamental problem that faced the Radicals, both during the Boer conflict and in the years leading up to the Great War, centred on what they could actually do in order to affect a change in British foreign policy. They seemed to be restricted to holding meetings, making speeches, writing pamphlets and preparing memorials. As a minority, they failed to bring their weight to bear in the corridors of power. The reasons for that are varied. One was that they were divided amongst themselves as to how to best proceed. Another reason was because they put reservations in the way of achieving their aims. Their principles seemed to be restricted by qualifications. Many of them had too narrow a conscience, thus earning themselves the description of ‘idealists’. At the time of the Boer War, for example, John Burns expressed his dislike for autocracy but struggled to disentangle it from his desire for peace. In a letter in December 1899 his opening sentences were ‘I am all for disarmament but let the Autocrats begin. The despotisms of Europe have yoked life, liberty, and labour to the chariot of war.’ Further on he claims ‘But Peace is too valuable to cast aside ...’ and ends with the exclamation: ‘I am therefore for Peace, but secured in such a way as the Free Peoples will not be at the

mercy of Kaiser, King or Czar.’<sup>7</sup> Likewise, the Radicals even hesitated over such mild measures as memorials. Charlotte Sidgwick<sup>8</sup> in March 1901 wrote to R.C.K. Ensor<sup>9</sup> about Russian State intrusion in education. In the letter Sidgwick claims to have nine signatures. She states that ‘The thing is detestably un-English, that is the worst of it, & the language being so too does not[sic] to my mind make matters much worse! - but my husband agrees with you in the sentiment, I think. (He has however signed).’ She continues her procrastination by the comment ‘I wish my husband could have written the form of Protest - but he couldn’t. We will see what Mr. Green thinks.’<sup>10</sup>

The Boer War compelled the British Government to bring the supposed policy of ‘Splendid Isolation’ to an end, firstly with the creation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, and then the Anglo-French Entente of 1904. The Alliance relieved Britain of much of the naval burden of protecting her Empire at a time when all the Great Powers were either building up their navies or seriously contemplating to start doing so. It was Thomas Lough<sup>11</sup> who, when talking about the proposed increase of naval expenditure, made the statement that of the navies of the other Powers ‘Next to France the largest expenditure on the Continent is that of Russia, ...’<sup>12</sup> He ranked Germany third. So it must have been a great relief to British naval policy-makers that Russia’s navy suffered such an enormous set-back as a result of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905.

However the advantages gained from the naval standpoint were somewhat offset by the shift in the balance of power in Europe. Russia’s loss was Germany’s gain and consequently British foreign policy had to undergo yet another searching review. Some military estimates put Russia’s recovery to be ten years away. Cecil Spring-Rice,<sup>13</sup> who was to become a British diplomat in Russia and who was certainly not a Radical, wrote from Scotland to J.A. Spender in August 1905, with a strong statement emphasizing the need for Anglo-French solidarity in the face of the German opportunity for European hegemony. He claimed that both Russia and Austria could be discounted for military purposes for the first time in a hundred years in Europe.<sup>14</sup> The ‘German Peril’ remained until the 1914–1918 War, despite the denial of it by many Radicals. In July 1908, for example, Bryce,<sup>15</sup> Cecil Spring-Rice and Dr. Dillon met, had lunch, and talked a great deal about foreign affairs. Bryce was ‘... much astonished at hearing so much talk about German hostility of which he doesn’t believe a word, thinking it all got up by journalists.’<sup>16</sup>

In examining what the Radicals did to register their antipathy towards autocratic Russia, one can draw the conclusion that H.N. Brailsford’s active involvement with Russian revolutionaries was not typical. Most Radicals relied instead on verbal and written protest. Brailsford seemed to be an extreme case of where the emotional aspects of Radicals were exaggerated. In May 1905 he wrote to Gilbert Murray that Father Gapon<sup>17</sup> would soon be returning to Russia to ‘lead a revolution of some sort.’ Gapon needed money, and Brailsford suggested that possibly some could be raised by public meetings in London and Paris, but that the drawback to that method, would be that the Russian secret police would know where he was and could prevent his return.

Consequently, Brailsford suggested to Murray that Gapon ‘... should visit a few groups of rich sympathetic people in country houses near London ... [.] No doubt many would pay to join in an exciting secret, & to say afterwards they had met him.’<sup>18</sup> In the letter, Brailsford asked Murray who was to organize the groups, and indeed went so far as to ask the latter if he could do anything. Brailsford realized the difficulty in obtaining help from fellow Radicals because ‘All the respectable people I know want to be Liberal Foreign Ministers.’ He attempted to allay Murray’s apprehensions about the scheme by stating that ‘Father G. [apon] is not a Socialist, still less a terrorist.’ The letter borders on the surreal: the ideas seem fantastic, naively so. Likewise, in the matter concerning the illegal acquisition of passports, Brailsford committed himself with his wife and his friend McCulloch to detective J. McCarthy on the ‘... explicit pledge that no proceedings would be taken against us, ...’ The fact that he had done so in writing, seems incredibly naive. In the same letter he maintained that if the authorities wanted to stop British people helping terrorists then they were ‘... on a wrong track. We had an explicit pledge that the passports would not be used for terrorism. So they need not imagine that they are punishing dangerous anarchists.’<sup>19</sup> Once again that seems to be taking trust too far. Finally, in a letter over a month later, from Brailsford to Gilbert Murray, the former complains that his Radical friends have been collecting money for his legal defence without his initial consent. He claimed that he would be glad if money were offered spontaneously from any members of the Society of Friends of Russian Freedom. However he did not wish to receive any financial assistance ‘... from people who disapprove however kindly ...’ and named as an example one of his old teachers from his student days at Glasgow University. What is particularly illuminating of his frame of mind is his last sentence where he maintained that ‘These little humiliations are to me infinitely worse than the trial itself and what I mind most is that I am afraid this must have hurt you.’<sup>20</sup> Was this pride on Brailsford’s part or an acutely sensitive conscience? The latter seems to be more in keeping with his other correspondence and to be a heightened form of what other Radicals possessed. His apparent contempt for the authorities, over the Passport case, was of concern to his friends, but undoubtedly evidence of a thorough Radical who was subordinating his personal safety and comfort to his principles.

The problem of what the Radicals could do to influence events, and also the difficulties that their moral scruples could produce for them, is evident in their attitude to physical violence in Russia. After all, many had strong pacifistic tendencies. They clearly abhorred the periodic massacres and pogroms that occurred in Russia. But how was the autocratic system to be removed? F.W. Pethick-Lawrence<sup>21</sup> in writing to his wife in July 1904 was able to condone the assassination of Plehve.<sup>22</sup> Pethick-Lawrence states that Plehve was a tyrant, and that in any country where freedom of expression was without banishment or torture such an act of murder ‘... would be an offence against the moral sense [.] would be an outrage [.] a crime ...’ Later in the same letter, he wrote ‘The shedding of another’s blood always seems to me ugly.’<sup>23</sup> The way Pethick-Lawrence squared his conscience to Plehve’s murder, was to seek higher principles, by

attributing the issue to divine intervention. Morally, one could not improve on that. He claims that '... if the Holy Spirit points it out to a man as the only way ---- it stands at the last in the same category as war -- there are some things greater even than the sacredness of human life --'.<sup>24</sup>

The extent to which non-Radicals and government officials could see matters differently, when commenting on Russia, can be ascertained from another assassination, that of Stolypin in 1911. Sir George Buchanan,<sup>25</sup> the British Ambassador to Russia, wrote to Sir Edward Grey, giving the official account of the deed and an assessment of the Premier's career. Buchanan related how the Second Duma was closed in 1907 and of how Stolypin restricted the franchise '... so as to secure the representation of the best classes, and to give to the landed proprietors and to those who had material interests at stake a preponderating voice in the representative Chamber.' He stated that Stolypin's new electoral law aimed at increasing the Conservative elements as much as possible '... and of eliminating or reducing the representation of all non-Russian nationalities.' Buchanan excused these anti-democratic measures

... his accusers are too apt to forget the difficulties with which he was confronted. ...

The mistakes which he may have made are, however, largely outweighed by the services which he conferred. Though he failed to destroy the seeds of unrest that still germinate under ground[sic], he rescued Russia from anarchy and chaos, and though forced to place her newly granted representative institutions on a narrower but firmer foundation, he saved them from the destruction which at one moment threatened them. ... M. [sic] Stolypin's death at the present moment is an irreparable loss to Russia, while in him His Majesty's Government have lost a loyal friend whose place it will be very difficult to fill.<sup>26</sup>

Sir George Buchanan thus appeared to have been an apologist for the autocratic system in Russia. With official assessments of this kind, it is not surprising that the latter's foreign policy was considered by the Radicals to be anti-democratic in its formulation and apologetic to absolutism in its practice.

## (II)

In any assessment of Radical attitudes towards Russia during this period, it is inevitable to broach the question of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's Radicalism. It was during his premiership that the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 was formulated and signed. The biographies of Sir Henry, namely by J.A. Spender<sup>27</sup> and John Wilson,<sup>28</sup> both claim that he knew of, and approved whole-heartedly of, what Sir Edward Grey was doing in bringing about the Entente. John Wilson maintains that from June 1906 Edward Grey, the Foreign Office, and Sir Arthur Nicolson in the Russian capital, had been working towards an arrangement with Russia.

Wilson claimed that:

In this they had C.B.'s full support. Many doctrinaire Liberals disliked the thought of any dealings with the Czarist autocracy. ... But C.B. believed that continued British Liberal attacks on the Czar's despotic rule only defeated their purpose by making the Czar more rigid and determined.<sup>29</sup>

Wilson then quotes a letter, in defence of his argument, from C-B to Grey of 8<sup>th</sup> October 1906, attacking the idea of a Liberal deputation to Russia as being in '... bad taste and ill-timed and may be mischievous.'<sup>30</sup> The same letter was used in G.M. Trevelyan's biography of Grey.<sup>31</sup> Wilson alleges Campbell-Bannerman's thorough consent to the arrangement with Russia, which not only reduced the likelihood of an alliance between Germany and Russia, but also '... secured India's northern frontier by laying down spheres of influence in Persia. In his view it removed, for a time at least, the danger of 'an Asiatic avalanche.'<sup>32</sup> The last phrase again comes from a letter, indeed the only other letter, yet again quoted in Trevelyan's book.<sup>33</sup>

Now in looking at Trevelyan's biography of the Foreign Secretary, one must keep in mind the essential fact that by the time he wrote it, between 1934 and 1937, he had abandoned Radicalism,<sup>34</sup> whereas he was reputed to have been enthusiastic in the years preceding the Great War. Additionally, one must seek the spirit behind Trevelyan's effort. David Cannadine in his biography of *G.M. Trevelyan* had no qualms about where that lay. Cannadine noted:

In analysing Grey's character and career as he did, Trevelyan had no doubt that he was acting as counsel for the defence. ... Beyond any doubt, he refuted the two basic arguments made by Grey's radical critics: that he was the secretive practitioner of the 'old diplomacy;' and that his manoeuvrings had helped to bring about war rather than prevent it. ... Trevelyan confessed in a footnote that in August 1914, 'we [the Radicals] were wrong, and Grey was right.'<sup>35</sup> ... he was equally concerned to dismiss the attacks mounted on him [i.e. Grey] by Lloyd George in his War Memoirs.<sup>36</sup>

So Trevelyan was certainly an apologist for Grey, and indeed by the 1930s, as a respected member of the academic establishment, one could hardly imagine him otherwise. Of course one cannot ignore the primary sources that Trevelyan used, but then, in view of the fact that he only cites two pieces of correspondence written directly between C-B and Edward Grey, the evidence is rather thin. One of those did not relate even to the Entente itself. Also it is now recognized that Trevelyan could be cavalier in handling his sources. For example, it is known that the private papers of Edward Grey went missing after Trevelyan wrote his biography of the Foreign Secretary.<sup>37</sup> He also chose to deny others the chance to look at his own papers for he destroyed them,<sup>38</sup> insisting that his 'scrawls' were 'never to be published.'<sup>39</sup>

In returning to the matter of Campbell-Bannerman's biographies and the light they might shed on whether he was a Radical or not, one has a problem of bias again in the official one produced in 1923 by J.A. Spender. According to F.W. Hirst<sup>40</sup> in *In The Golden Days*, Spender was appointed to write the work '... to the disgust of Ponsonby.' This disapproval was because Spender had

... been an unwavering supporter of Asquith and Grey, ... [and] could not have been expected to present Campbell-Bannerman's political character in a true light. He was not intimate with C.-B. and one might read these two thick volumes without discovering what were Campbell-Bannerman's real relations with the Liberal Imperialists or how far he was from sharing Grey's views of foreign policy.<sup>41</sup>

Hirst maintained '... that Campbell-Bannerman was not kept fully informed by Grey and Haldane ...' about the secret commitments with France. Also Hirst was of the opinion that Campbell-Bannerman had only reluctantly appointed Edward Grey as Foreign Secretary in December 1905. This last point is supported by Arthur Ponsonby who maintained that not only were the relations between the two men strained so that they never met socially, but also and more seriously, Campbell-Bannerman did not trust Grey politically, so that their estrangement was a distinct barrier to Campbell-Bannerman's being able to interfere with the Foreign Office.<sup>42</sup>

When one remembers Campbell-Bannerman's stance regarding the Boer War, and in particular his 'methods of barbarism' speech, is it conceivable that he really believed in an Entente with an autocratic regime that was oppressing and persecuting its own people so badly? The Dogger Bank incident in October 1904 showed how his Radical emotions could precede the more cautious approach of first ascertaining the facts and possibly holding an enquiry. Instead, he declared in a speech at Norwich on 25<sup>th</sup> October, that the incident was no accident '... because the big guns of great ships do not go off by accident. Misunderstanding it was not, for there was nothing to misunderstand. (Hear, hear.) Blunder it was not, for it was on too large a scale and too deliberate.' Earlier in the speech, he went as far as to say, that if in anyway the action had been sanctioned by the Russian government, then '... no language would be too strong, and no action too strong to adopt in reply to it. (Cheers).'<sup>43</sup>

The events of 1905 were momentous for Russia. The consequences of defeat by the Japanese produced revolutionary fervour in the autocratic empire which resulted in the establishment in May 1906 of the Duma. British Radicals were delighted that the forces of absolutism had suffered such a set-back. However their joy was to be relatively short-lived, for once the Tsar felt sufficiently strong enough again, he suspended the Duma after only ten weeks. The day after its dissolution, Campbell-Bannerman was due to address the Inter-Parliamentary Union, in the Palace of Westminster, which comprised representatives of all the European Parliaments, including, that year, those from the Duma. Campbell-Bannerman addressed the five hundred

delegates from the twenty-two parliaments and very diplomatically began ‘... I make no comment on the news which has reached us this morning; this is neither the place nor the moment for that. We have not a sufficient acquaintance with the facts to be in a position to justify or criticise.’ He then proceeded to let vent to his Radical emotions by loudly exclaiming that ‘... The Duma will revive in one form or another. We can say with all sincerity, “The Duma is dead; long live the Duma.”’<sup>44</sup>

So could a Prime Minister expressing such sentiments feel able to agree to the creation of the Anglo-Russian Entente so soon afterwards? One suggested answer given above, is that he simply was not kept fully informed about matters of foreign affairs, and that as he did not find Grey an approachable person, Campbell-Bannerman did not realize the significance of what was being done. However one needs to put that idea into the context of Campbell-Bannerman’s wider pre-occupations.

He may have felt that an arrangement was possible with Russia now that her naval and military disasters in the war against Japan had occurred, and the subsequent beginnings of constitutional government had begun. The former idea may have been based on the realization that German hegemony in Europe was now a distinct possibility and not just a remote idea. An arrangement with Russia would be welcomed by France and would be a natural follow-on from the Anglo-French Entente of 1904. Campbell-Bannerman may have thought that a new era had begun in Russian politics with the creation of the Duma and the tenuous restrictions on the Tsar’s absolutist powers. Campbell-Bannerman did not live long enough to see the declining liberal element as each of the four Dumas came and went, and the subsequent re-assertion of the Tsar’s autocratic powers.

A further theory as to why Campbell-Bannerman consented to an entente with Russia, is that he had little choice but to accept the direction that Grey and the Foreign Office were taking Britain in international affairs, because of the desire to maintain Liberal Party unity. The Liberal Party had been split in 1886 over Gladstone’s desire for Home Rule for Ireland, and the Party was split badly over the Boer War. In December 1905 Campbell-Bannerman had been obliged to form a Cabinet that included the various sections of the Party, that is the Liberal Leaguers as well as the Radicals. Though the 1906 General Election helped him in producing such a large majority over the Conservatives, nevertheless, the advantage permitted internecine wrangling within the Liberal Party. Anyway it may have been that, like most Radicals, he was more interested in pushing ahead with the domestic issues involving the creation of a welfare programme, rather than with foreign matters. Arthur Ponsonby in referring to C-B’s party dilemma considered the following

... to be the most dramatic triumph of C.-B.’s career. C.-B.’s eventual victory over the Tories and Jingos [sic] was generally considered by the outside public to be a sensational and extraordinary achievement. But far more remarkable, far more



significant, and at the same time far less known, was his triumph over the Liberal Imperialists inside the ranks of the Liberal Party.<sup>45</sup>

Stephen Koss, claimed that ‘... one is usefully reminded of Campbell-Bannerman’s Radical sentiments, ...’ in referring to Herbert Lewis’s transcript, of what Lloyd George told the latter, about a Cabinet meeting in December 1906, concerning the Education Bill.<sup>46</sup>

The third and final factor for consideration, were the circumstances of his personal life. Very little attention has been given to this as a factor in his late political career and yet it must have influenced him. It would seem positively unreasonable to make out that these did not have a major impact on his thinking. His Austrian physician, Dr. Ernest Ott, wrote to him in December 1905, advising him that he ought seriously to consider moving to the House of Lords for the sake of his health and in view of his age. The physician wrote freely that

... I am sure that those who are persuading you to remain in the House of Commons are not your true friends ... But if they don’t care so much for your health as perhaps for your glory - or political reputation - I must call them very short-sighted, as they don’t think what may be the end, if you are overworking yourself, and then in shorter or longer time a very bad reaction with all its consequences may set in and deprive them for a long time if not for ever of their illustrious leader. ...<sup>47</sup>

Just five days before this letter was estimated to have reached Campbell-Bannerman, the latter had already made his decision. Within ten months of receiving that well-intentioned letter C-B suffered his first heart attack,<sup>48</sup> no doubt brought on by the shock of the death of his wife a month previously.<sup>49</sup> A second attack occurred in June of the following year.<sup>50</sup> The loss of his wife was recorded on the first anniversary in his diary by ‘Dies illa lacrimabilis.’<sup>51</sup> The day after that first anniversary he received a letter from Sir Edward Grey announcing the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Entente.<sup>52</sup> One wonders how much Sir Henry would have cared about receiving that letter at such a moment in time. He was 71 years old with rapidly declining health and his partner of 46 years standing had gone. On the night of 13-14<sup>th</sup> November 1907 he received a further set-back to his health which now meant that the public knew, followed by a heart attack at Biarritz on the 28<sup>th</sup> of the same month. An upsurge in his illness on the night of 12-13<sup>th</sup> February 1908 meant that he never left his room in 10, Downing St. again. He resigned the Premiership on 3<sup>rd</sup> April and died nineteen days later on 22<sup>nd</sup> April 1908.<sup>53</sup>

The controversy whether Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman remained Radical to the end of his life, is a very difficult one to resolve, but on balance the evidence suggests that he did. Even if he did know the implications of the Anglo-Russian Entente, he could still have been claimed a Radical identity despite coming to terms with autocratic Russia.

## (III)

British Radicals were split over their attitudes to the revolutionary events in Russia and to the creation of the Entente. Over the Duma, for example, Bertrand Russell wrote in May 1906 to Gilbert Murray exclaiming that ‘... Yes, I have been thinking just the same about the Duma. ...’<sup>54</sup> And Nevinson wrote in his journal in March 1907, admiringly in agreement with Brailsford’s article in the *Nation* about the Second Duma, ‘... much better than I could have done it ... [and] about my pain and distress at his splendid article ...’.<sup>55</sup> However when Nevinson sent a strong letter to the *Daily Chronicle* about the Duma and the Russian army the editor ‘... neither inserted nor returned [it] though I asked him.’<sup>56</sup> His journal entry for the next day states that he believed that the newspaper ‘... had purposely crowded out my letter ...’ on that topic which left him depressed.<sup>57</sup>

Nevinson’s journal is a record that shows something of the consternation and divisions that Radicals faced over the prospects of an Entente with Russia. It also highlights the dilemma of what to do about it. On 7<sup>th</sup> May 1907 Nevinson states that he attended the weekly *Nation* lunch and that he ‘... Pushed opposition to [the] Russian alliance agst [sic] Hirst. ...’<sup>58</sup> The following week at the next luncheon he had a ‘... rather bitter dispute with Hirst about Russia.’<sup>59</sup> The very same evening at a large dinner gathering consisting of

... Masterman - The Trevelyan, Galsworthy, Winston [Churchill], L<sup>d</sup> Advocate [Bernard Shaw, Sydney Buxton, Ponsonby, L<sup>d</sup> Rob<sup>T</sup> Cecil & one or two others ... [Nevinson had] ... some good convers[ation] with S. Buxton on the Russian agreement. ...<sup>60</sup>

The next day he attended a ‘Meeting of Friends of Russian Freedom & a few others in Adelphi to discuss action agst [sic] proposed alliance. ...’<sup>61</sup>

Clearly the frequency with which Nevinson discussed the matter showed that he was very worried about Great Britain coming to any such arrangement with Russia. Also it is informative that he used the word ‘alliance’ for that is how the Radicals saw it to be. Some were of a similar mind to him for he ‘Went to [the] Club for B[railsford]’s article against [the] Russian alliance. ...’<sup>62</sup> On Whitsunday he ‘Wrote a longish letter to [the] Daily News against [the] Russian alliance, & a short one to [the] W.G. [i.e. Westminster Gazette] on [the] Subject Races. ...’<sup>63</sup> Those letters appeared in those newspapers on 21<sup>st</sup> May.<sup>64</sup> The following day Nevinson:

... Did an article on [the] subject races ... & wrote [a] draft letter against [the] Russian alliance. [He] Went to [a] small meeting on that with Hobson, the fool Green & Rothstein at [the] NLC [i.e. National Liberal Club].<sup>65</sup>

Furthermore, he attended a meeting of the Russian Social Democrats in Islington at which

there was ‘... rather [a] chaotic mixture of men, women, pies & orange peel.’ He relates how Mrs. Stepniak brought along another Russian called Khimstaloff. Nevinson recognized a further individual who had ‘... just escaped from life exile in Siberia. ...’<sup>66</sup> Next day Nevinson visited Brailsford about the fund to pay the return fare to Russia of the delegates of the Russian Social Democrats conference.<sup>67</sup>

On that day while at the home of the Russian expert, Hagberg Wright, he met, amongst others, ‘... 2 Foreign Office men, one called Clarke who mocked ...’ him. They reminded Nevinson of the problems facing the Radicals, by stating about the topic that they were discussing, that ‘... the question was quite hopeless ... & “continued to occupy the attention of the few.” (laughter).’<sup>68</sup> The presence of the men from the Foreign Office shows the ease with which news and ideas could be circulated between Radicals and non-Radicals. The Foreign Office jibe also indicates that non-Radicals and officialdom knew fully the weakness of the Radicals’ position.

Nevinson, having written to newspapers and attended meetings against a Russian agreement, turned to the Radicals’ time-worn tradition of preparing a memorial on the subject. His idea and the strength of feeling surrounding it can be ascertained from his journal entry for 29<sup>th</sup> May when ‘... Refusals to sign my anti-Russian entente memorial also came from Meredith & Seely. I don’t know why people live.’<sup>69</sup> Two days later the ‘... Russian memorial meeting agreed to wait for more names.’<sup>70</sup> Meanwhile, dissension continued at the *Nation* lunches. He had a ‘... violent discussion on [the] Russian entente. ...’ at the 4<sup>th</sup> June meal, with ‘... B. [Brailsford] backing me up agst [sic] Massingham & Hirst.’<sup>71</sup> Three days later Nevinson gave a speech against the Russian ‘alliance’ at the New Reform Club to

... a crowded audience of men & women - Wise C.S. Pogosky, Free Russia, Lawrence, ... & others. I spoke rapidly & with good point for just an hour - sketch of the movement & parties, Tsardom, terrorism, the Cadets, our position, Servia & general appeal: ended with chant “To their eternal memory” with good effect. ...

And yet again dissension showed in the Radical ranks for ‘... L<sup>d</sup> Courtney replied with “moderation & sagacity” & some horror & bitterness at my violence. ...’ Nevinson responded by ‘... taking advantage of Courtney’s description of himself as a Cadet on the slippery slope of compromise and asking when we had ever seen him there. [The] Meeting was very enthusiastic.’<sup>72</sup> Radical disagreements on the proposed Anglo-Russian Entente abounded. On 10<sup>th</sup> June Nevinson discussed the ‘... alliance with Hammond & Lehmann. He [i.e. one of those two] thought no harm cd [sic] be done if limited to [the question of] frontiers.’<sup>73</sup>

Just as Nevinson had difficulty at the end of April and beginning of May (as mentioned above) with the *Daily Chronicle* over his letter about the Duma, so likewise he experienced trouble with the same newspaper regarding his views about the proposed Russian understanding. On 14<sup>th</sup> July<sup>74</sup> Nevinson records in his journal that for the *Daily Chronicle* he wrote a

... strong leader against [the] Russian alliance. Jones cut it down to a few lines as agst [sic] [the] policy of [the] paper & I said it was better to cut it out altogether. This was done, Jones expressing personal regrets. I said "I don't know why you call yourselves a Liberal paper. It is ludicrous," & came away. ...<sup>75</sup>

That this disagreement upset Nevinson a great deal there can be no doubt, for besides an immediate sleepless and unhappy night, the matter continued for several more days. At a lunch with Massingham and Cross (the Rowntree's solicitor) two days after, he was strongly advised not to resign from the *Daily Chronicle* as '... on no paper can one hope to agree with more than  $\frac{3}{5}$  of policy.'<sup>76</sup> The following day however he wrote an apology to Jones '... for violence & offering [his] resignation as [he was] not moderate enough for [the] paper.'<sup>77</sup> While having to cope with these differences of opinion Nevinson continued to attack non-Radicals for their support of an entente with Russia. At the same time as his *Daily Chronicle* dispute he wrote '... a strong letter ...' to J.A. Spender of the Westminster Gazette about the '... "self-righteousness" & the Russ. [ian] entente ...' in the latter's leader of 15<sup>th</sup> July.<sup>78</sup>

The historian A.J.P. Taylor quite aptly labelled the Radicals to be 'The Trouble Makers' for in this analysis, H.W. Nevinson, having written in protest to his employing newspapers and to those holding opposing views; having attended meetings to discuss, argue and give speeches; and having become involved in the formulation of a memorial, clearly wished to leave no possibility untried of critical opposition to the proposed policy with Russia. On 24<sup>th</sup> July 1907 he visited the House of Commons to '... get Philip Snowden to promise [a] question to Grey about [the] entente with Russia.'<sup>79</sup> Even putting their views to Sir Edward Grey was a far from easy matter. Brailsford, who was a naturally very self-effacing man, gives a hint of this problem, in a letter in January 1909, to Walter Runciman, then at the Board of Education. Brailsford in writing of Grey states that '... I do not know him to approach him. I am a Pro-Boer, & a free-lance & an opponent of his Russian policy, & I cannot expect from him any sort of conversation. ... could you talk to him? ...'<sup>80</sup>

#### (IV)

The creation of the Anglo-Russian Entente at the end of August signified the failure of the Radicals to influence British foreign policy. The Radicals received another set-back in the following Spring with the death of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and his subsequent replacement as Prime Minister by the non-Radical H.H. Asquith.

It was a natural corollary to the Entente that the two countries should do something diplomatically to demonstrate their closer relations. When Asquith routinely informed the King of the Cabinet discussion of 6<sup>th</sup> May 1908, he let it be known that the Foreign Secretary was to make public Edward VII's '... intention to proceed by sea to Reval, and there return the Czar's

visit to this country. ...<sup>81</sup> The Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons that Edward VII was carrying out the customary official visit of a newly-crowned sovereign to another head of a European State. The Tsar's visit which was referred to above, had come at the beginning of the Tsar's reign, and likewise fulfilled a usual official obligation.<sup>82</sup> No mention by Asquith was made of it at that time being linked in anyway with the previous year's Convention. It was Grey who first drew reference of one with the other on 28<sup>th</sup> May in answer to a question from the Radical MP for South West Ham, W. Thorne. Grey made it clear that the King's visit was an official one and that '... The relations between the two Governments are those manifested by the Convention, ...'.<sup>83</sup>

Radicals such as H.C. Lea<sup>84</sup> and H.F.B. Lynch, enquired why the King would not be accompanied, according to the constitution, by a member of the Cabinet.<sup>85</sup> The object of this questioning, which was repeated on 1<sup>st</sup> June, was to ensure that Parliament knew what transpired between the two sovereigns.<sup>86</sup> The Radicals were wary of any further secret undertakings being made, following on from the Convention.<sup>87</sup> Further, J.G.S. MacNeill<sup>88</sup> increased the pressure on the Government, by pointing out that as no minister was to be with the monarch while abroad, that the Crown's authority was accordingly temporarily diminished in Britain for there would be '... an abeyance of all his functions, ...'.<sup>89</sup>

By 3<sup>rd</sup> June, W. Thorne referred in the House to the memorial signed by various MP's requesting that the proposed visit should be a private one and divested '... of a State or official character.'<sup>90</sup> Radical emotions were rising for the MP asked in exasperation '... whether they were to understand that the Government acquiesced in the brutal murders that took place in Russia?' To cries of 'Order,' the Speaker added 'That is hardly proper language to apply to a friendly State.'<sup>91</sup>

That the Radicals did not trust Sir Edward Grey and his Foreign Office colleagues is further evident by the fact that J.G.S. MacNeill pointedly asked Grey why the arrangement with Russia the previous autumn had not been made public until the day after Parliament rose. He also pointed out that Parliament had neither been advised nor consulted about its terms. Grey side-stepped the implied charge of official secrecy. He answered that there had simply not been time to do otherwise, due to the need to let Persia and Afghanistan know first of what was happening diplomatically.<sup>92</sup>

The climax to the agitation orchestrated by the Radicals against the King's visit to the Tsar came with the debate held on 4<sup>th</sup> June 1908. In order not to personalize the attack on the monarch the motion was put that the sum of £100 be deduced from that to be allocated for the salaries and expenses of the Foreign Office. Radicals such as J.G.S. MacNeill and Keir Hardie<sup>93</sup> spoke strongly against the visit. But other Radicals also spoke for it, such as Hilaire Belloc, T. Hart-Davies<sup>94</sup> and Fred Maddison.<sup>95</sup> Amongst the non-Radicals, A.J. Balfour, the Leader of the Opposition, committed his opinion and that of his Party in support of the Government.

Sir Edward Grey defended the proposed visit and rebutted the charge made by some

Radicals that it would be in Britain's moral interests to boycott Russia totally until there was a change of heart away from autocratic misrule. Grey said that:

Objection is taken on the ground that so long as the internal affairs of Russia do not sometimes have the approval of those who object, Russia should be kept at arm's length - "boycotted" I think was the term which has been used this afternoon - and that there should be neither visit nor Convention. The consequences of such a policy as that must be disastrous to both countries. ...<sup>96</sup>

At one point Grey actually went so far in defence of the visit as to say '... If, then, the Government here were to advise the King to take up the attitude suggested towards the Emperor, you might as well tear up the Anglo-Russian Convention; ...'<sup>97</sup>

Keir Hardie was very outspoken against the visit. When he stated that for the King to pay an official visit to the Tsar it '... was to condone the atrocities for which the Czar's Government, and the Czar personally, must be held responsible; ...'<sup>98</sup> the Speaker called him to order. The latter maintained that '... it is not in order to speak in that way of a friendly Power. [Cries of "Oh! "]'<sup>99</sup> Hardie wanted to use the term 'atrocities' as he maintained that '... I know no other word in the English language to express my meaning.'<sup>100</sup> After a prolonged exchange with the Speaker, Hardie was compelled to withdraw the word under the coercion of the immediate termination of the debate.<sup>101</sup> The proceedings then continued. Amongst the points made, Hardie maintained that as the Tsar had not kept his word with his own subjects in internal Russian politics, then he was hardly likely to be trusted in international affairs: '... It was a danger to any country to have an alliance or agreement with a country for which he was autocratically responsible. ...'<sup>102</sup>

When the division bells rang the motion received the resounding defeat of 225 votes against 59.<sup>103</sup> The Radicals were badly split. Amongst the 'Ayes' some of the leading Radical names were W.P. Byles, Keir Hardie, E.G. Hemmerde,<sup>104</sup> H.C. Lea, R.C. Lehmann, Ramsay MacDonald, J.G.S. MacNeill, Arthur Ponsonby, A.H. Scott<sup>105</sup> and W. Thorne. Of those who chose to vote as 'Noes' a selection of Radicals could include Hilaire Belloc, John Burns, Winston Churchill, David Lloyd George, Thomas Lough, Fred Maddison, Philip Morrell, John Simon,<sup>106</sup> George Toulmin<sup>107</sup> and J.C. Wedgwood. Clearly, if the Radicals could not agree to act in unison on such an issue as this, then the chances of affecting British foreign policy in their favour were negligible.

The day after the debate one of the Radicals who had voted against the King's visit received a sharp rebuke from Joseph A. Pease, the Government Chief Whip. Arthur Ponsonby was reprimanded for having shown disloyalty to his Party and for not accepting the better judgement of Sir Edward Grey. Pease wrote that:

... On an occasion like yesterday, it is no excuse to say "Oh The government were safe enough, & I wished to express by my vote my horror at the things done by the Russian

government.”

The question I submit you ought to ask yourself is, can I justify the course I have taken if the government is defeated. Remember the enormous issues at stake, ...<sup>108</sup>

This is a good example of the pressure that the Radicals were under not to dissent from the policies of their respective Parties. Ponsonby immediately replied to Pease outlining his beliefs and reasons for voting the way he did. He stated that

... it seems to me unfair that the matter should be brought before the House a day or two before the King actually starts so that any protest that is made which must have the appearance of a desire to reverse the decision has all its force taken from it simply from the fact that it comes too late. ...<sup>109</sup>

Was the timing another example, along with that of the initial announcement of the Entente, of Edward Grey employing a strategy to minimize protests against his policy? Even he admitted that with the Entente it looked like that.<sup>110</sup>

Those Radicals who had supported the Entente could still object to the King's visit. Keir Hardie, for example, repeated the analogy first made in the debate by Harwood (MP for Bolton), by saying '... that it was one thing to have business relations with a man when compelled to do so, but that it was another thing to invite that man to your house as your guest. That disposed of the treaty objection. ...'<sup>111</sup> This mirrored Ponsonby's attitude as expressed in the same letter to Pease mentioned above. He wrote that '... Grey really did not defend the visit but got out of it by mixing it up with the Convention of which I was entirely in favour. ...'<sup>112</sup>

Ponsonby re-assured Pease of his loyalty to the Liberal Party in claiming that if the Government had been in any real danger of defeat then that '... wd [sic] at once outweigh the considerations produced by the particular question under discussion ...' Ponsonby went further, in indicating that he would be prepared to compromise his Radical convictions, as expressed in the final sentence in the letter: 'But I can assure you I do not intend to be troublesome ... and I shall probable [sic] get my conscience completely under control before long.'<sup>113</sup> This letter therefore highlights some of the major reasons why the Radicals failed to make a decisive impact on British foreign policy, namely the divisions amongst themselves, and also their unwillingness to pursue their moral convictions in the face of what seemed to be important political matters. The same would happen in the summer of 1914.

The Radicals over-estimated their own importance. They were a minority and yet they claimed to act or speak on behalf of a much larger following. It could be argued that if they had a more realistic appreciation of their numbers they might have taken more notice of the means by which they could express what strength they had. On 13<sup>th</sup> June Ponsonby prepared a letter for *The Times* or Sir James Smith, but which was never sent. In it he again defends himself

against the charges of disloyalty to the King, to his political party and to the Government over the vote made on 4<sup>th</sup> June. He maintained that ‘... it is making the King give expression to a cordiality which his subjects do not feel. ...’<sup>114</sup> And again, in the same letter, he claims to speak for a far greater number in defence of his loyalty to the Liberal Party:

... As far as the party is concerned least of all is the charge correct. There are many, I should not be far out I daresay if I said the majority of the Liberal Party who entirely agree with the view I take, because they deeply resent the suppression of the first efforts for liberty in a great nation. In the House of Commons many liberal members abstained from voting which is a course I probably shall adopt when confronted with a similar problem in time to come. ...<sup>115</sup>

How did Ponsonby know what the British people felt on this matter and how could he claim the Government to be wrong in their approach, when in fact, it was the people who had voted it into office in the first place? Surely the landslide victory of 1906 in which his Party triumphed was a clear expression of the will of the people. Ponsonby’s argument to the latter would be that the people did indeed put the Liberals in power, but that foreign policy was formulated in a shroud of secrecy by Sir Edward Grey and the Foreign Office without due consultation with the House of Commons. Furthermore, in examining what Ponsonby wrote, it can be stated that it does not speak highly for Radical convictions if they chose to abstain on issues of which they disapproved. If they did not have the courage of their convictions to oppose what they believed to be wrong, then how could they possibly hope to have foreign policy conducted in accordance with their wishes?

Ponsonby was not alone in finding himself initially excluded from the Royal Garden Party guest list. However it was one of his elder brothers, ‘Fritz,’ who was the King’s private secretary, who informed him as to possible thinking behind his exclusion. Arthur Ponsonby, because of his family connections with the Court, was also considered to be personally associated with it. Therefore his vote against the King’s visit seemed double effrontery. And somewhat more ominously: ‘... The King is reported to have said that he thought it very bad taste on your part to go on living at St. James’s. I don’t know who told him you were there.’<sup>116</sup> The idea that Ponsonby could be required to leave his ‘grace and favour’ accommodation may have been a means of pressure to be held in readiness for any future misdemeanour. As Fritz claimed that ‘... nothing has been said to me and I am only talking gossip’<sup>117</sup> it could well have been intended that such a threat was meant to be overheard or somehow find its way back to Arthur Ponsonby.

Further letters passed to and from Ponsonby. In one he wrote to Lord Francis Knollys, a private secretary to the King, of his views and that as he represented ‘... some 50 thousand loyal Scottish subjects of His Majesty ... [his] being singled out for this very conspicuous mark of royal



displeasure is a reflexion on my constituency ...'<sup>118</sup> Ponsonby also drew Knollys attention to the fact that the other Liberals who had voted on 4<sup>th</sup> June against the visit had been sent invitations to the Garden Party. Knollys refused to show the letter to the King. However, the Royal displeasure seemed to pass by 3<sup>rd</sup> July<sup>119</sup> and the Lord Chamberlain sent an official invitation card to Ponsonby to attend a State Ball at Buckingham Palace on 10<sup>th</sup> July.<sup>120</sup>

Ponsonby had made his democratic point in the face of considerable pressure from a distinctly undemocratic hierarchy. Even though the matter had officially been closed, no doubt his vote and subsequent reaction was remembered indefinitely. The matter had certainly established Arthur Ponsonby as a Radical MP. Indeed it was at this time that Massingham first invited him to attend the weekly lunches of the Nation.<sup>121</sup> Indeed it was not long before Ponsonby registered his opinions about Russia again, for he gave his maiden speech in the House of Commons on 27<sup>th</sup> July 1908, which concerned the state of affairs vis-à-vis the Balkans and concluded with comment about oppression in the Tsarist Empire.<sup>122</sup>

It was to be expected that the King's visit to Russia would be returned by the Tsar coming to Britain. Before 'the dust had settled' over Ponsonby's reprimand, C.P. Trevelyan took the opportunity of asking the Foreign Secretary whether plans were afoot for such a return visit.<sup>123</sup> Another Radical, W. Thorne, asked the question in July, the day after Ponsonby's maiden speech, and received the same negative answer.<sup>124</sup> The Radicals were ready and waiting for the opportunity to put their protest again, if need be. They did not have long to wait, for by the summer of 1909, the arrangements had been made for the Tsar to pay an official visit to Britain. He was to meet King Edward VII on board ship at Cowes and to be received by the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the First Lord of the Admiralty.

Debate about the visit arose on 22<sup>nd</sup> June, along with other international matters, in the course of the Foreign Office expenditure allocation. Arthur Henderson<sup>125</sup> began by criticizing the visit on the grounds of the deplorable repression in Russia. He quoted many figures of imprisonment, suicides in prison, and executions, all based on Kropotkin's recently published book *The Terror in Russia*. Henderson maintained that far from the state of affairs having improved in Russia, in the preceding months, as a result of the King's visit to Reval, matters had actually got worse and record figures were achieved in 1908 and 1909. He said that:

... From these figures it would appear that the strong humanitarian appeals that have been made by Count Tolstoi and others have been unheeded, and that any influence exercised as the result of the visit to Reval seems to have been rendered entirely nugatory. ...<sup>126</sup>

Henderson made it clear that the figures relating to the deplorable repression in Russia meant that the Tsar and the Russian Government were to be held responsible. Henderson's appeal was the classic Radical viewpoint of appealing to his fellow MPs on grounds of humanitarian concern

for the people of Russia.

Sir Edward Grey, who would not have his policy influenced by emotional considerations, replied in a purely legalistic way. He claimed that Henderson's speech put '... the Government in an impossible position.' He claimed that internal affairs of other countries were no concern of Britain's '... in which we have no treaty obligation and treaty rights, ...' His devastating answer was that:

... It is not our business even to know what passes in the internal affairs of other countries where we have no treaty rights. [Cries of "Oh, oh," and Mr. MacNeill: "Is it not?"] Even if we do know, we cannot discuss it. ...<sup>127</sup>

No doubt Ireland would have been somewhere to the fore-front of his mind.

Additionally, Grey denied the truth of Henderson's account based on Kropotkin's figures. Edward Grey said that he had other sources of a more reliable nature. His repudiation ran:

... I have had more than one instance recently of the fact that people who are interested in their own countries, and who come over here to acquire facts with regard to countries with which they have something to do, make statements which are not in accordance at all with the facts of the case. ... [and] ... they should bring out the whole state of the case, and not part of it. ...<sup>128</sup>

Grey made it clear that he rather chose to believe the representatives of the Russian Duma.<sup>129</sup> The charge against the validity of Kropotkin's information was a very serious one, for as mentioned in this author's previous article about Russia, the Radicals relied heavily on such unofficial sources of news and information as the émigrés gave them. No doubt Edward Grey realized that Russian official sources would be virtually inaccessible to the Radicals, and anyway as a political figure himself, he probably felt more at ease in dealing with other government officials. Keir Hardie, later in the debate, countered by claiming that the true representatives of Russia as elected to the First Duma were now '... rotting in prison.' He maintained that those who visited Britain from the Third Duma were no more representative of the people of Russia '... than a deputation from another place across the Lobby would represent the people of England. ...'<sup>130</sup>

Earl Percy<sup>131</sup> put the point that those who criticized the Anglo-Russian agreement and the monarchical visits were doing so in order to appeal '... to the interest of a particular party or movement in Russia. ...'<sup>132</sup> He thought that to question what effect the visit of the Tsar or the Entente would have on Russia's domestic politics was as pointless as inquiring what effects the Anglo-French Entente '... would have been upon the interests of the monastic orders in France.'<sup>133</sup> As if to further belittle the Radical position, Percy claimed that the Russian Entente was created '... without dissent or serious criticism from any political party in this House, ...'<sup>134</sup>

Hilaire Belloc spoke in favour of the Tsar's visit, affirming the idea that the Russian monarch symbolically represented his nation. According to him, that was the opinion of '... every expert in Russian affairs, every man profoundly acquainted with Russian history, Russian language, and Russian literature - and those experts can always be counted on the fingers of one hand ...'<sup>135</sup> He praised '... Maurice Baring, who is my intimate friend, [and] knows the country from top to bottom. ...' while totally repudiating '... the natural bitter writings of exiles, ...'<sup>136</sup>

In view of the concerted attack on the Radicals source of information, which if proven to be true, would greatly undermine the Radicals argument, Keir Hardie stated upon what authority they were based. Firstly, they were compiled from newspaper reports which were repeated in speeches in the Duma, and secondly, provided by the Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior on the express instructions of the Duma.<sup>137</sup> Hardie claimed insight into Russian internal politics by the assertion that all gradations of advanced opinion '... from the extreme Socialists to the mildest Liberals, ...' regarded the Tsar's visit as a set-back to their cause for it gave official recognition to him from a great State.<sup>138</sup>

In contrast to Keir Hardie, the extreme non-Radical view was expressed by J.D. Rees.<sup>139</sup> He claimed to be the only Russian interpreter in the House of Commons. He pointedly denied Keir Hardie any knowledge of Russia and rendered a somewhat boastful and sycophantic story, involving the Tsarevitch, of which he had been able to experience while he himself had been in Russia.<sup>140</sup> His attitudes and manner must have riled the Radicals. For example, he patronizingly referred to the agricultural peasants of Russia as those '... who are excitable creatures, ...' He ridiculed the use of Kropotkin as a source by asking:

... I should like to know whoever would go for information concerning the prison system of a country to one whose acquaintance with it was formed as a prisoner himself, to an exile from his own country, animated by the greatest feeling against it, and, as is usual with enthusiasts of that character, not too particular with the statistics of which he made use. ...<sup>141</sup>

Both his opening and closing remarks relating to the topic of the Tsar's visit were nothing short of offensive to Radical sentiments. He had begun his speech by consigning humanitarianism to history. In referring to Britain's past humanitarian schemes he said '... But times have changed since then ...' and unless Britain were to acquire a navy to put the country in a similarly relative position of comparative strength vis-à-vis other navies then '... it must be recognised that those days are far passed, and that other considerations must guide the Foreign Office - considerations of prudence and reason such as we have had laid before us by the Foreign Secretary to-day. ...'<sup>142</sup> He ended his speech on a note that would also have been found repugnant to Radicals, in the very denial of their democratic right to discuss the issue of the visit. He stated that in Sweden, when a motion of a similar type was proposed, the Chamber

refused any discussion of it, ‘... and I wish it had been so here. ...’<sup>143</sup>

The key to the Radicals’ objection to the Tsar’s visit was based on humanitarian concern for those suffering in Russia. MacNeill clearly stated that Radicals were prepared to elevate that concern over legalistic matters of consideration. For example he said

... we, on the contrary, consider that while we may be breaking international comity, we are fulfilling the instincts of humanity in protesting against a reception being given officially to the head of a country which at the present moment is soaked in innocent blood. ...

and in defending Kropotkin, MacNeill stated that the Prince had ‘... protested and raised his voice against scandals which were abhorrent to humanity. ...’<sup>144</sup>

MacNeill described Edward Grey as ‘... a gentleman who is somewhat phlegmatic and constitutionally not inclined to take the same view of the tortures and suffering of humanity as some of us inferior beings do. ...’ This accusation levelled against Grey was not new. H.N. Brailsford, for example, had written the same thoughts to E.D. Morel over the Congo agitation as long ago as September 1906:

... My own impression, speaking quite frankly, is that Grey is by temperament quite indifferent to all humanitarian issues, & that when he talks of waiting for Belgian opinion to move, he means only that he is glad of any excuse for doing nothing himself. ...<sup>145</sup>

And returning to MacNeill again:

... I have discharged my conscience. As I looked at the true Radicals and saw the anger, and the proper anger, of the great Labour party, who are an international party, and who know what labour is and what labour suffers, and when I heard ... [Grey’s praise of the Russian system and Government], I said to myself, “Oh, for one hour of Gladstone!” ... He, whose generous heart and wide feeling led him to come back, not for ambition, but because he felt for the sufferings of the Bulgarians, would he have said that British interests are at stake, and that we had no right to interfere?<sup>146</sup>

John Dillon,<sup>147</sup> leader of the Irish Nationalists, made the same point and asserted in their praise that ‘... so far as foreign affairs are concerned, the Radicals of today are behind the Whigs of the last century. ...’<sup>148</sup> He also, with regard to the notion of continuity in foreign policy made an ‘... appeal to the Liberal party to abandon this principle, and to be true to the old traditions of Radicalism in this respect. ...’<sup>149</sup> Arthur Ponsonby, who made the last speech of the debate, contrasted the Foreign Secretary’s effort with that of Gladstone. He stated that ‘... The strength

of our diplomacy, the force of our opinion in the councils of Europe, depends on the detached, disinterested, humanitarian views we have taken in upholding the freedom of downtrodden peoples. ...’ He then gave examples and proceeded to express opinions deploring the passing of the humanitarian considerations:

... I am afraid the modern idea is to disapprove the humanitarian view and sympathetic attitude of those who appreciate the liberties of the people and to put in its place the force of Empire and of armaments. ... Throughout the last half-century it has been to our credit that the greatest success we have had has been our strong feeling of humanitarianism and our desire to uphold the views of people who are downtrodden. ...<sup>150</sup>

When the vote was taken, the motion to reduce the salary of the Foreign Secretary, was defeated by 187 to 79. In briefly examining the Division list, if one takes the arbitrary selection of twenty prominent Radical names mentioned above as having voted for and against the King’s visit to Russia the previous summer, all but six, voted in a similar fashion over this visit. Whereas in 1908 E.G. Hemmerde, R.C. Lehmann, and W. Thorne had voted for the £100 reduction, in other words in protest against the King’s visit, on this occasion no vote of any kind was registered. Likewise of the three who in 1908 had voted for the King’s visit, namely Fred Maddison, Philip Morrell and J.C. Wedgwood, only the last-named person chose to appear on the list as voting differently in 1909.<sup>151</sup>

## (V)

During the remaining years of peace preceding the Great War, when not pre-occupied with Anglo-German relations, the Radicals were most concerned with Russia’s involvement in Persian affairs. Indeed in 1911–1912 it looked very much as if Russia was on the point of swallowing up the remainder of Persia. However as this study of Radical attitudes to Russia is confined to Eastern Europe, little more need be said about Persia. Their pattern of protest was similar to that described in relation to European Russia. They attended meetings of the Persian Committee; <sup>152</sup> made speeches inside and outside of parliament drawing attention to Russian atrocities committed on the democratically inclined Persians; <sup>153</sup> raised petitions<sup>154</sup> and produced pamphlets,<sup>155</sup> all to no avail. The divisions amongst the Radicals continued to exist<sup>156</sup> rendering effective opposition to Grey’s foreign policy impossible.

In the summer of 1914 determined Radicals still could not see why Britain was obliged to support Russia in its stand against Germany and Austria-Hungary. For example, George Greenwood<sup>157</sup> wrote to Ponsonby on 31<sup>st</sup> July stating that ‘... I think it would be absolutely monstrous if this country were to go to war in support of Russia - in this miserable quarrel between Austria & Servia. It is to me unthinkable. ...’<sup>158</sup> The Radicals could not understand why

Britain should ally itself to the personification of absolutism in a dispute involving the distant land of Servia. They pointed to the tradition of antagonism and concern that had existed over many years between Britain and Russia. An admirer of John Burns wrote to him the day after the British declaration of war lamenting that:

... Years ago the Jingos [sic] used to sing a ditty with a refrain: "And the Bear shall not march into Constantinople" And now they are shouting to help him to get there - and further - such is constancy in human values. ... for Russia ... I hope the "little father" and Grand dukes will get a drubbing; after that there may be a chance of bringing a bit more civilization into that country, ...<sup>159</sup>

On 7<sup>th</sup> August H.A.L. Fisher writing from Sheffield to Gilbert Murray deploring the international news claimed, that in his opinion, of the belligerents, only Russia desired war.<sup>160</sup> Two days later C.H. Norman<sup>161</sup> wrote to John Burns congratulating the latter on his resignation from the Cabinet. Norman stated that:

... We have been outwitted by Russia ... At the time of the Russian entente, I wrote an article fearing it would lead us into a Continental war in seven years. It has done so, & I suppose Germany[,] France & ourselves will be ruined in this contest & Russia will dictate her own terms, or else there will be a stalemate. ...<sup>162</sup>

Even in 1915 Brailsford was able to write that the origin of the war was the Russo-German quarrel. France was attacked because she was Russia's ally. Britain was involved in the conflict because it was fulfilling its agreement to protect the French coast from German attack by sea and therefore became dragged into the war.<sup>163</sup>

In contrast to these critics of Russia, one could cite, the opinion of one of the experts on Russia, Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace. In October 1914 he produced, for example, a pamphlet on behalf of the Victoria League called *Our Russian Ally*. In it he maintained that Russia over the previous fifty years had been 'particularly successful' in making up 'for lost time' with regard to her strides towards civilization.<sup>164</sup> He then played down the possibilities of conflict between the British and Russian Empires. The spirit of the pamphlet may be gauged by the statement that '... the average Englishman is still reluctant to admit that an avowedly autocratic Government may be, in certain circumstances, a useful institution.'<sup>165</sup> It bears witness to the saying that in war the first casualty is truth.

## CONCLUSION

During the period of 1900–1914, the Radicals simply failed to influence British foreign policy

towards Russia. This they recognized themselves at the time. Even when they claimed the success for the postponement of the visit of the British fleet to Kronstadt in 1906, they were mistaken. In reality, it was the Russian Government that had withdrawn the invitation, because of Russia's domestic strife. Over the discussion of that issue, and over the creation of the Anglo-Russian Entente, as well as with the two monarchical exchange visits of 1908 and 1909, the Radicals had shown themselves to be desperately divided in their opinions and totally lacking any policy. They based their arguments on emotionally charged humanitarian appeals that could not match the cold, legalistic statements of Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues. Those Radicals who were interested in foreign policy, were a minority of the total number of Radicals, who were in turn a minority in society.

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> For a definition of the term 'British Radicals', see the articles listed at the end of the text of this publication. The author of this article is not to be associated in any way with the political viewpoints of the Radicals expressed herein.
- <sup>2</sup> *Free Russia*, November 1899, p. 74.
- <sup>3</sup> *ibid*, November 1899, p. 74.
- <sup>4</sup> *ibid*, January 1900, p. 2.
- <sup>5</sup> *ibid*, February 1900, p. 1.
- <sup>6</sup> *ibid*, July 1902, p. 1.
- <sup>7</sup> Burns to Mead, 5<sup>th</sup> December 1899, Burns Papers. Vol. VII. Br. Mus. Add. Ms. 46,287. F. 239–240.
- <sup>8</sup> Charlotte Sophia Sidgwick (1853–1924), author of *The Story of Norway* (1885) and *The Story of Denmark* (1890) intended for school study. Wife of Arthur Sidgwick M.A. (1840–1920) Oxford educationist and classical scholar of Greek.
- <sup>9</sup> Robert Charles Kirkwood Ensor (1877–1958), journalist and historian. Joined *Manchester Guardian* 1901, succeeding L.T. Hobhouse as a leader-writer. Moved to London three years later and contributed to various journals, including the *Speaker*, the *Nation*, and the *Tribune*. Edited with an introduction *Modern Socialism, as set forth by socialists in their speeches, writings, and programmes* (1904). Active in Labour politics, serving in 1909 on the National Administrative Council of the Independent Labour Party. On Executive Committee of the Fabian Society 1907–1911 and 1912–1919. Member of London County Council 1910–1913. Having been at the Bar of the Inner Temple 1905–1909 he left to become a leader-writer for the *Daily News* 1909–1911, a position he lost when it merged with the *Morning Leader*. Appointed Chief Leader-writer on *Daily Chronicle*, 1912–1930. Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Committee which had been established in early 1912 in vain with a view to checking Edward Grey's anti-German foreign policy. With regards to Russia, he believed that objections to the Tsarist regime should not affect British statesmen. He wrote in the *New Statesman* that there was 'a strong case for the entente with Russia' (25.4.1914). As with so many other Radicals the outbreak of war compelled him to shift towards an anti-German stance based on the perceived unacceptability of the latter's invasion of Belgium. Following his journalistic career's end in 1930 he became a historian, most notably producing *England, 1870–1914* (1936).
- <sup>10</sup> J.F. Green was Co-editor with F. Volkovsky of *Free Russia*.  
C. Sidgwick to Ensor, March 1901, Box 13, R.C.K. Ensor Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

- <sup>11</sup> Thomas Lough (1850–1922), Wholesale tea merchant. Liberal MP for West Islington 1892–1918 when defeated. Parliamentary Secretary to Board of Education, Dec. 1905–April 1908. H.M. Lieutenant of County Cavan 1907–. Privy Councillor 1908. Advocated the ‘Newcastle’ and ‘London Liberal’ programmes, with Labour Reform, etc. Authored: *England's Wealth - Ireland's Poverty* (1896); *Glimpses of Early Ireland. A Lecture, etc.* (1888); *Irish Financial Relations* (1901); etc.
- <sup>12</sup> *Hansard*, vol. 103, col. 761, 21<sup>st</sup> February 1902.
- <sup>13</sup> Cecil Spring-Rice (1859–1918), British diplomat who was posted to Washington 1887, Tokyo 1892, again Washington 1893, Berlin 1895, then Constantinople, Teheran 1899, Cairo 1901, St. Petersburg 1903 (where he was involved in the early negotiations leading to the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907), then Foreign Office's special representative to the U.S. President 1905, and British Minister in Teheran 1906. Successively Ambassador to Persia 1906–1908, Sweden 1908–1912, and the U.S.A. 1912–1918 in the latter role being instrumental in helping persuade the Americans to end their neutrality during World War 1.
- <sup>14</sup> Spring-Rice to Spender, 11<sup>th</sup> August 1905, Spender Papers, Vol. VI. Br. Mus. Add. Ms. 46,391, see F. 142–149.
- <sup>15</sup> James Bryce (1838–1922), Liberal MP for Tower Hamlets 1880–1885, then Aberdeen South 1885 until appointed British Ambassador at Washington 1907–1913. Called to Bar at Lincoln's Inn 1867. Parliamentary Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs 1886. Privy Councillor 1892. Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster with seat in the Cabinet 1892. Chairman of the Royal Commission on Secondary Education 1894–1895. President of the Board of Trade 1894–resigned with the Rosebery Ministry 1895. Chief Secretary for Ireland December 1905–January 1907. OM 1907. Created 1<sup>st</sup> Viscount Bryce 1914. G.C.V.O. 1918. Various writings, amongst which: *The Holy Roman Empire* (1864); *Report on the Condition of Education in Lancashire* (1867); *Transcaucasia and Ararat: being notes of a vacation tour* (1877); *The American Commonwealth* (3 vols., 1888); *Impressions of South Africa* (1897); *Studies in History and Jurisprudence* (1901); *Studies in Contemporary Biography* (1903); *The Near Eastern Question and the Position of Russia and Austria. Report of a speech delivered by the Rt. Hon. J. Bryce on March 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1905* (The Eighty Club, 1905); *Address on the Teaching of History in Schools, etc.* (Historical Association Leaflet no. 4, 1907); *The Hindrances to Good Citizenship* (1909); *University and Historical Addresses* (1913); *Modern Democracies* (2 vols., 1921); etc.
- <sup>16</sup> His Journal: 29<sup>th</sup> July 1908–30<sup>th</sup> July 1908. Misc. 77/9, 20<sup>th</sup> Sept. 1907–5<sup>th</sup> April 1909, p. 32, G.W. Prothero Papers, King's College Library, Cambridge.
- <sup>17</sup> Georgy Gapon (1870–1906), Russian Orthodox priest. Popular lower class leader and police informant. Following an excellent primary school record, he was granted a place at the Lower Ecclesiastical School in his native Poltava. During his final year there he was introduced to the radical ideas of Leo Tolstoy. On leaving, he entered Poltava Seminary where he continued his interest in Tolstoyan matters. Gapon not only admired the Tolstoyan ideas of working with the poor, but also the philosophical criticism of the hierarchical nature of the Church. Met opposition from seminary officials by rejecting further financial aid and seeking to pay for his studies through work as a private tutor. Following setbacks, such as being ill from typhus, he made an apologetic behavioural, successful appeal to the Bishop of Poltava in order to resume priestly studies. Once being made a priest at the Poltava Cemetery Church his novel and informal style led to a rapid growth in the congregation, to the chagrin of other local, more formal clergy. Following the death of his wife in 1898, Gapon decided to start a new life by moving to St. Petersburg. He successfully entered the Saint Petersburg Theological Academy where he did extremely well. Became involved through the ‘Society for Religious and Moral Enlightenment in the Spirit of the Orthodox Church’ with the urban proletariat by giving religious discussions in lodgings, in mess halls, and on industrial premises. Became psychologically exhausted and spent a year in the Crimea regaining his health. Still influenced by Tolstoyan disciples he returned to St. Petersburg



to help the unemployed. Gapon with financial support from Colonel Motojiro Akashi of the Japanese army organized the 'Assembly of Russian Factory and Mill Workers of St Petersburg', open to Russian Orthodox members, aiming to defend worker's rights and uplift their moral and religious state. However this organization was also patronized by the Police Department and the St. Petersburg Okhrana. The organization grew to 8,000 members in 12 branches. Gapon tried to expand it to Kiev and Moscow. Gapon co-operated with the police with a view aiming to plan for a change to the conditions of the lower classes in Russia. But from 1904 onwards, he started to work with revolutionaries who wanted the abolition of autocracy. On 9<sup>th</sup> January (O.S.) 1905, the day after a general strike had broken out in St. Petersburg, Gapon led a procession of workers with a view to presenting the Tsar with a petition. The shooting down of the crowd on this, Bloody Sunday, led Gapon to anathematize the Tsar. Gapon called on the people to act against the regime. He escaped abroad, where he had close contacts with the Social Revolutionary Party. He was welcomed by emigrés such as Plekhanov, Lenin, and Prince Kropotkin, as well as the French socialist leaders Georges Clemenceau and Jean Jaurès. He found refuges in Geneva and London. However after the Russian October Manifesto he returned to his native land and resumed contacts with the secret police. He was subsequently hanged by members of the Social Revolutionary Party, almost certainly on 26<sup>th</sup> March 1906.

<sup>18</sup> Brailsford to Murray, 5<sup>th</sup> May 1905, MSS Gilbert Murray 124, Reel 42. Gilbert Murray Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

<sup>19</sup> Brailsford to Murray, 13<sup>th</sup> May 1905, MSS Gilbert Murray 124, Reel 42. Gilbert Murray Papers.

<sup>20</sup> Brailsford to Murray, 14<sup>th</sup> June 1905, MSS Gilbert Murray 124, Reel 42. Gilbert Murray Papers.

<sup>21</sup> Frederick William Pethick-Lawrence (1871–1961), Labour MP for West Leicester 1923–1931, and East Edinburgh division 1935–1945. Privy Councillor 1937. Social worker of the London East End. Called to bar by Inner Temple 1899. Opposed to Boer War. Proprietor 1901 and subsequently Editor of the evening *Echo* 1902–1905. East End work superseded by strong support with wife of women's suffrage, even to the point of going to prison and being forcibly fed. As a pacifist refused to do military service during the First World War. Honorary Treasurer of the Union of Democratic Control (UDC) 1916. Financial Secretary to the Treasury 1929–1931. Secretary of State for India and Burma 1945–1947. Baron 1945–1961. Writings: *Fate Has Been Kind* (autobiography 1942); etc.

<sup>22</sup> Vyacheslav von Plehve (1846–1904), Joined Russian Ministry of Justice 1867. Assistant Prosecutor in Vladimir Circuit Court and as Prosecutor in Vologda. Appointed Assistant Prosecutor of Warsaw Chamber of Justice 1876. Prosecutor of St. Petersburg Chamber of Justice 1879. Investigated the murder of Tsar Alexander II 1881. Joined the MVD as a Director of the Police Department, also being in charge of the Okhrana. Became a member of the Governing Senate 1884, and Assistant Minister of the Interior 1885. Made an Actual Privy Counsellor 1899, and was Finnish Minister Secretary of State from then until his assassination in 1904. Supported the abolition of the separate Finnish army 1901. Appointed Russian Minister of the Interior and Chief of the Gendarmes 1902. He survived one assassination attempt in 1903 and two more in 1904, before the terrorist branch of the Socialist Revolutionary Party succeeded by throwing a bomb into his horse-drawn carriage whilst on his way to his weekly audience with the Tsar.

<sup>23</sup> Pethick-Lawrence to wife, 28<sup>th</sup> July 1904, P-L6<sup>77(1)</sup>. F.W. Pethick-Lawrence Papers, Trinity College Library, Cambridge.

<sup>24</sup> Pethick-Lawrence to wife, 28<sup>th</sup> July 1904, P-L6<sup>77(1)</sup>. F.W. Pethick-Lawrence Papers.

<sup>25</sup> George William Buchanan, Sir (1854–1924), Diplomat. Entered diplomatic service 1876 and served as Second Secretary in Tokyo, Vienna and Berne, followed by Secretary in Rome. Served on the Venezuelan Boundary Commission 1899, and later in the same year appointed Chargé d'affaires at Darmstadt and Karlsruhe. Moved

to Berlin where he was appointed First Secretary 1901. Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Bulgaria 1903–1908. Minister to the Netherlands and Luxemburg 1909. Same year received GCVO and made a Privy Councillor. British Ambassador to Russia 1910–1918. During the war informed the Tsar of the perilous path that the latter was set on. Buchanan kept close contacts with the Kerensky administration, fearful of the Bolsheviks seizing power. Ambassador to Italy 1919–1921. Writings: *My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories* (autobiography 1923).

<sup>26</sup> WR 58, 25<sup>th</sup> September 1911, Section 2, 'Affairs of Russia,' [37365] (No. 270). W. Runciman (Viscount Runciman of Doxford) Papers, Newcastle University.

<sup>27</sup> *The Life Of The Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman G.C.B.* (1923).

<sup>28</sup> *CB. A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman* (1973).

<sup>29</sup> *ibid.*, p. 545.

<sup>30</sup> C-B to Grey, 8<sup>th</sup> October 1906, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 545.

<sup>31</sup> G.M. Trevelyan, *Grey of Fallodon* (1937), p. 190.

<sup>32</sup> John Wilson, *CB. A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman* (1973), p. 546.

<sup>33</sup> C-B to Grey, 3<sup>rd</sup> September 1907, quoted in G.M. Trevelyan, *Grey of Fallodon* (1937), p. 189.

<sup>34</sup> David Cannadine, *G.M. Trevelyan* (1992), p. 165.

<sup>35</sup> Originally quoted in G.M. Trevelyan, *Grey of Fallodon* (1937), p. 254 footnote 1.

<sup>36</sup> David Cannadine, *G.M. Trevelyan* (1992), p. 165.

<sup>37</sup> Keith Robbins in *Sir Edward Grey* states 'That Sir Edward's private papers seem completely to have disappeared...' He asks 'If any readers have any knowledge of them, I should be pleased if they would write to me.' p. vii. He mentions that he (i.e. Robbins) was only preceded as a biographer of the Foreign Secretary by G.M. Trevelyan, p. xiv.

<sup>38</sup> David Cannadine, *G.M. Trevelyan* (1992), p. xiv.

<sup>39</sup> *ibid.*, p. 243 Appendix F; also p. 248 footnote 11 of same, which refers to clause 3(b) of the Will of GMT, 1<sup>st</sup> March 1960, p. 1.

<sup>40</sup> Francis Wrigley Hirst (1873–1953), Journalist, Economist. Called to Bar 1899. Joined League of Liberals Against Aggression and Militarism in opposition to Boer War. Editor of *The Economist* 1907–1916, then of *Common Sense* 1916–1921. Opposed to British involvement in Great War, particularly because of the economic consequences of the interruption of the normal flow of commerce, also the long-term effects of the national debt to be incurred. Of his many writings: A chapter entitled 'Liberalism and Wealth' in joint-edited *Essays in Liberalism by Six Oxford Men* (1897); contributed chapters 2,4,6,8–9,11,13,15–19 of *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone* (ed. by Sir Wemyss Reid 1899); *Free Trade and Other Fundamental Doctrines of the Manchester School* (1903); *Adam Smith* (1904); *Monopolies, Trusts and Cartels* (1905); *Arbiter in Council* (anonymously published 1906) about the economic futility of war; *A Library of Peace and War* (1907); *The Credit of nations* (1910); *The National Expenditure of the United Kingdom* (1911); *The Stock Exchange. A short study of investment and speculation* (in series 'Home University Library' 1911); *The Treatment of Commerce in Naval Warfare*. (A paper read at the National Peace Congress held in London, 16<sup>th</sup> May 1912); *Progress of the Nation* (1912); *The Six Panics and Other Essays* (1913); *The Political Economy of War* (1915); *The Early Life and Letters of John Morley* (2 vols. 1927); *Gladstone as Financier and Economist* (1931); *The Consequences of the War to Great Britain* (1934); *Economic Freedom and Private Property* (1935); *In the Golden Days* (autobiographical 1947); etc. See also: *F.W. Hirst By His Friends* (1958).

<sup>41</sup> F.W. Hirst, *In The Golden Days* (1947), p. 251.

<sup>42</sup> *ibid.*, p. 262. Originally from Arthur Ponsonby's 20,000 words of notes of impressions.

<sup>43</sup> *The Times*, 27<sup>th</sup> October 1904, p. 5.

<sup>44</sup> J.A. Spender, *The Life Of The Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman G.C.B.* (1923), Vol. 2, p. 263.

<sup>45</sup> F.W. Hirst, *In The Golden Days* (1947), p. 253.

<sup>46</sup> Quoted in S. Koss, *Nonconformity in Modern British Politics* (1975), p. 83. Originally from Lewis Papers, 29<sup>th</sup> December 1906, Memorandum entitled 'L.G. & Education Bill.'

<sup>47</sup> J.A. Spender, *The Life Of The Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman G.C.B.* (1923), Vol. 2, p. 199. Originally Dr. E. Ott to Campbell-Bannerman, 9<sup>th</sup> December 1905.

<sup>48</sup> 2<sup>nd</sup> October 1906 at Belmont. *ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 297.

<sup>49</sup> 30<sup>th</sup> August 1906. *ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 293.

<sup>50</sup> 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1907. *ibid.*, Vol. 2, p. 356.

<sup>51</sup> 'Oh! Mournful Days.'

<sup>52</sup> 31<sup>st</sup> August 1907. J.A. Spender, *The Life Of The Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman G.C.B.* (1923), Vol. 2, pp. 361–362.

<sup>53</sup> *ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 372–373, 379, 388, 390.

See also for health bulletins *The Times* of 15<sup>th</sup>, 16<sup>th</sup>, 18<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> November and 11<sup>th</sup> December 1907.

<sup>54</sup> Russell to Murray, 15<sup>th</sup> May 1906, MSS Gilbert Murray 165, Reel 54, F. 109. Gilbert Murray Papers.

<sup>55</sup> 2<sup>nd</sup> March 1907, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, pp. 17–18. H.W. Nevins Journals, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

<sup>56</sup> 30<sup>th</sup> April 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 46.

<sup>57</sup> 1<sup>st</sup> May 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 46.

<sup>58</sup> 7<sup>th</sup> May 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 48.

<sup>59</sup> 14<sup>th</sup> May 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 51

<sup>60</sup> 14<sup>th</sup> May 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, pp. 51–52.

<sup>61</sup> 15<sup>th</sup> May 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 52.

<sup>62</sup> 18<sup>th</sup> May 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 54.

<sup>63</sup> 19<sup>th</sup> May 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 54.

<sup>64</sup> 21<sup>st</sup> May 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 54.

<sup>65</sup> 22<sup>nd</sup> May 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 55.

<sup>66</sup> 23<sup>rd</sup> May 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 55.

<sup>67</sup> 24<sup>th</sup> May 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 56.

<sup>68</sup> 24<sup>th</sup> May 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 56.

<sup>69</sup> 29<sup>th</sup> May 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 59.

<sup>70</sup> 31<sup>st</sup> May 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 61.

<sup>71</sup> 4<sup>th</sup> June 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 63.

<sup>72</sup> 7<sup>th</sup> June 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, pp. 64–65.

<sup>73</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> June 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 87.

<sup>74</sup> Nevins heads this entry in his journal as 'Bastille Day.' Quite apart from possibly being indicative of the fighting spirit that he may have felt in opposing the Entente and therefore resisting autocracy, perhaps he felt that a similar day might be necessary in Russian history before the forces of liberalism eventually triumphed. Anyway in the absence of such an interpretation it may simply have been yet another example of a Radical illustrating his fascination for history.

<sup>75</sup> 14<sup>th</sup> July 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 89.

<sup>76</sup> 16<sup>th</sup> July 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 90.

<sup>77</sup> 17<sup>th</sup> July 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 90.

<sup>78</sup> 15<sup>th</sup> July 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/1, p. 90.

<sup>79</sup> 24<sup>th</sup> July 1907, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e614/2, p. 5.

<sup>80</sup> Brailsford to Runciman, 7<sup>th</sup> January 1909, WR 29. W. Runciman Papers.

<sup>81</sup> Asquith to Edward VII. Cabinet, 6<sup>th</sup> May 1908, MS Asquith 5. F. 27–28, H.H. Asquith Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

<sup>82</sup> *Hansard*, vol. 189, col. 963, 26<sup>th</sup> May 1908.

<sup>83</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 189, col. 1262, 28<sup>th</sup> May 1908.

<sup>84</sup> Hugh Cecil Lea (1869–1926), Liberal MP for East St. Pancras 1906–Jan. 1910 when retired. Member of London County Council 1910–1913. Served in both British and American armies. Newspaper proprietor owning the *Wine and Spirit Trade Record*. Also on staff of the *African Review*.

<sup>85</sup> *Hansard*, *ibid.*, vol. 189, col. 1290–1291, 28<sup>th</sup> May 1908.

<sup>86</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 189, col. 1570–1571, 1<sup>st</sup> June 1908.

<sup>87</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 189, col. 1262, 28<sup>th</sup> May 1908.

<sup>88</sup> John Gordon Swift MacNeill (1849–1926), Irish Nationalist MP for Donegal South 1887–1918 when retired. Called to the Bar 1876. Examiner Law School, Trinity College Dublin 1880. Professor of Constitutional and Criminal Law, King's Inns Dublin 1882–1888. QC 1893. Dean of Faculty of Law, Professor of Constitutional Law, and Clerk of Convocation in National University of Ireland 1909–. Member of Committee of Privileges 1908. Instrumental in achieving the abolition of flogging in the Royal Navy 1906. Opposed the eventual handing over of Heligoland to Germany 1890. Supported British involvement in the First World War. Successfully campaigned for the removal of titles from German members of the royal family 1917. Author of: *The Irish Parliament: What it was, and what it did* (1885); *English Interference with Irish Industries* (1886); *How the Union was Carried* (1887); *Titled Corruption; the sordid origin of some Irish peerages* (1894); *The Constitutional and Parliamentary History of Ireland till the Union* (1917); *Studies in the Constitution of the Irish Free State* (1925); *What I Have Seen and Heard* (memoirs 1925).

<sup>89</sup> *Hansard*, *ibid.*, vol. 189, col. 1570, 1<sup>st</sup> June 1908.

<sup>90</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 190, col. 41, 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1908.

<sup>91</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 190, col. 42, 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1908.

<sup>92</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 190, col. 187, 4<sup>th</sup> June 1908.

<sup>93</sup> James Keir Hardie (1856–1915), Leader of the Labour Party in the House of Commons 1906–1908. Labour MP for South West Ham 1892–1895 when defeated, then for Merthyr Tydvil Oct. 1900–death Sept. 1915. A miner aged 10–23. Miner's Union Secretary 1879. Journalist with *Cumnock News* 1882. Chairman of Independent Labour Party 1894–1900 and 1913–1914. Founder, and Editor of *The Miner* 1888, subsequently renamed the *Labour Leader*. Of his writings: *From Serfdom to Socialism* (1907); *India: Impressions and Suggestions* (1909). See biographies: *J. Keir Hardie: A Biography* by William Stewart (1921); *Keir Hardie* by Hardie's son-in-law Emrys Hughes (1956), and *Keir Hardie; Radical and Socialist* by Kenneth O. Morgan (1975); *Keir Hardie* by I. McLean (1975); *Keir Hardie* by F. Reid (1978).

<sup>94</sup> Thomas Hart-Davies (1849–1920), Liberal MP for North Hackney 1906–Jan. 1910 when defeated. Indian Civil Service 1867, for 28 years in the Bombay Presidency, mostly in Sind Division as an administrator and judge. Of his extensive travels, he went to Siberia and Persia. Amongst his writings, translations of: Catullus; Reliaeff's poems; Gogol's *Revizor*.

<sup>95</sup> Frederick Maddison (1856–1937), Liberal MP for Brightside Division of Sheffield 1897–1900 when defeated, then Burnley 1906–Jan. 1910 when defeated. Compositor. Chairman of Trades Union Congress 1886. First lower class member of Hull Corporation 1887–1889. Offered a post in Labour Department of Board of Trade

1892. A labour journalist. Secretary of International Arbitration League.
- <sup>96</sup> *Hansard*, *ibid.*, vol. 190, col. 236, 4<sup>th</sup> June 1908.
- <sup>97</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 190, col. 239, 4<sup>th</sup> June 1908.
- <sup>98</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 190, col. 253, 4<sup>th</sup> June 1908.
- <sup>99</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 190, col. 254, 4<sup>th</sup> June 1908.
- <sup>100</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 190, col. 254, 4<sup>th</sup> June 1908.
- <sup>101</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 190, col. 258, 4<sup>th</sup> June 1908.
- <sup>102</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 190, col. 260, 4<sup>th</sup> June 1908.
- <sup>103</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 190, col. 265–268, 4<sup>th</sup> June 1908. Division List No. 114.
- <sup>104</sup> Edward George Hemmerde (1871–1948), Liberal MP for East Denbighshire Aug. 1906–Dec. 1910, then North West Norfolk 1912–1918 when retired; thereafter as Labour MP for Crewe Division of Cheshire Nov. 1922–1924 when defeated. Bar 1897. KC 1908. Recorder of Liverpool 1909–1948. Playwright.
- <sup>105</sup> Alfred Henry Scott (1868–1939), Liberal MP for Ashton-under-Lyne 1906–Dec. 1910 when defeated. A Director of Burgons Limited wholesale provision dealers of Manchester. Member of Manchester City Council 1897–1906. Vice-President of Association of Municipal Corporations. Alderman of London County Council 1913–1922, thereafter in retirement same at Margate where he was also a JP. Favoured Home Rule for Ireland; land, mines and railway nationalization; abolition of House of Lords; the temperance movement; women's enfranchisement; and reform of the army.
- <sup>106</sup> John Allsebrook Simon, Sir (1873–1954), Liberal MP for Walthamstow Division of Essex 1906–1918 when defeated in December in East Walthamstow, then for Spen Valley Division of Yorkshire November 1922–May 1940 when created Viscount Simon. Barrister 1899, Solicitor-General 1910–1913, the youngest since the 1830s. Privy Councillor 1912. Attorney-General with seat in Cabinet 1913–1915. Home Secretary May 1915–January 1916 when resigned. Leader of the Liberal National Party 1931–1940. Lord Chancellor 1940–1945. One of only three people to have served as Foreign Secretary (1931–1935), Home Secretary (for a second time as 1935–1937), and Chancellor of the Exchequer (1937–1940), others being R.A. Butler and J. Callaghan.
- <sup>107</sup> George Toulmin, Sir (1857–1923), Liberal MP for Bury May 1902–1918 when defeated. (In 1900, when he unsuccessfully first tried for Parliament he stood with the description of 'Radical'). Journalist and newspaper proprietor. Owner of *Preston Guardian*. Founder of *Lancashire Daily Post* 1886. With brother started *Blackburn Times* and *Warrington Examiner*. Chairman of the Press Association; Honorary Treasurer of the Newspaper Society; and Fellow of the Institute of Journalists. During his time in Parliament he was pre-occupied with domestic issues, such as trying to fix minimum wages in certain trades, and in measures to alleviate the increasing number of traffic accidents caused by motor vehicles.
- <sup>108</sup> Pease to Ponsonby, 5<sup>th</sup> June 1908. May–Dec. 1908, MS Eng. Hist. c657, F. 67–68. Arthur Ponsonby (Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede) Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford.
- <sup>109</sup> Ponsonby to Pease, 6<sup>th</sup> June 1908. MS Eng. Hist. c657, F. 70–71. Arthur Ponsonby Papers.
- <sup>110</sup> *Hansard*, vol. 190, col. 187, 4<sup>th</sup> June 1908.
- <sup>111</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 190, col. 253, 4<sup>th</sup> June 1908.
- <sup>112</sup> Ponsonby to Pease, 6<sup>th</sup> June 1908. MS Eng. Hist. c657, F. 71. Ponsonby Papers.
- <sup>113</sup> Ponsonby to Pease, 6<sup>th</sup> June 1908. MS Eng. Hist. c657, F. 72. Ponsonby Papers.
- <sup>114</sup> Addressed: 'My dear Sir James,' 13<sup>th</sup> June 1908. MS Eng. Hist. c657, F. 90. Ponsonby Papers.
- <sup>115</sup> Addressed: 'My dear Sir James,' 13<sup>th</sup> June 1908. MS Eng. Hist. c657, F. 90–91. Ponsonby Papers.
- <sup>116</sup> Ponsonby, F. to Ponsonby, A., 17<sup>th</sup> June 1908. MS Eng. Hist. c657, F. 95. Ponsonby Papers.
- <sup>117</sup> Ponsonby, F. to Ponsonby, A., 17<sup>th</sup> June 1908. MS Eng. Hist. c657, F. 96. Ponsonby Papers.

<sup>118</sup> Ponsonby to Knollys, 23<sup>rd</sup> June 1908. MS Eng. Hist. c657, F. 114–115. Ponsonby Papers.

<sup>119</sup> Knollys to Ponsonby, 3<sup>rd</sup> July 1908. May-Dec. 1908, MS Eng. Hist. c657, F. 130–131. Ponsonby Papers.

<sup>120</sup> Lord Chamberlain to Ponsonby, before 10<sup>th</sup> July 1908. May-Dec. 1908, MS Eng. Hist. c657, F. 133. Ponsonby Papers.

<sup>121</sup> Massingham to Ponsonby, 25<sup>th</sup> June 1908. May-Dec. 1908, MS Eng. Hist. c657, F. 118. Ponsonby Papers.

<sup>122</sup> 27<sup>th</sup> July 1908. May-Dec. 1908, MS Eng. Hist. c657. Notes for it: F. 137–140. Ponsonby Papers. He had been elected MP for Stirling Burghs in May.

<sup>123</sup> *Hansard*, vol. 190, col. 712, 16<sup>th</sup> June 1908.

<sup>124</sup> *ibid*, vol. 193, col. 1230, 28<sup>th</sup> July 1908.

<sup>125</sup> Arthur Henderson (1863–1935), Labour MP for Barnard Castle Division of Durham July 1903–1918 (the first Labour Representation Committee victory achieved in a three-cornered fight), then Widnes Division of Lancashire Aug. 1919–Nov. 1922 when defeated, then Newcastle East Jan.–Dec. 1923 when defeated, then Burnley Feb. 1924–Oct. 1931 when defeated, then Clay Cross Division of Derbyshire Sept. 1933–his death. (As of the time of this writing, his five times of elections in constituencies where he had not previously held the seat is unique - he holds the record for the greatest number of comebacks.) Chairman of the Labour Party in the House of Commons 1908–1910, 1914–1917 and 1931–1932. Became first member of Labour Party to hold a Cabinet position as President of the Board of Education May 1915–Aug. 1916. Paymaster General Aug.–Dec. 1916. Minister without Portfolio Dec. 1916–Aug. 1917. Home Secretary Jan.–Nov. 1924. Foreign Secretary June 1929–Aug. 1931. Leader of the Labour Party and therefore of the Opposition 1931–1932. (As of the time of this writing, uniquely served separate terms as Leader of the Labour Party in three successive decades). Privy Councillor 1915. For his work with the World League of Peace and his chairing of the Geneva Disarmament Conference he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1934. See: *Unemployment in Germany, etc.* (Independent Labour Party Pamphlets and Leaflets, with George N. Barnes 1908); *The Aims of Labour* (1917); *Prussian Militarism. An interview given by the Right Honourable A. Henderson ... to Mr. Arthur Draper* (1917), etc.

<sup>126</sup> *Hansard*, vol. 8, col. 644, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>127</sup> *ibid*, vol. 8, col. 657, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>128</sup> *ibid*, vol. 8, col. 658, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>129</sup> *ibid*, vol. 8, col. 660, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>130</sup> *ibid*, vol. 8, col. 678, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>131</sup> Henry Algernon George Percy, Earl Percy (1871–1909), eldest son of 7<sup>th</sup> Duke of Northumberland. Conservative MP for Kensington South 1895–1909. Under-Secretary of State for India 1902–1903, then Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 1903–1905. Due to his death at just 38, a younger brother, Alan, inherited the title of becoming the 8<sup>th</sup> Duke of Northumberland.

<sup>132</sup> *Hansard*, vol. 8, col. 662, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>133</sup> *ibid*, vol. 8, col. 663, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>134</sup> *ibid*, vol. 8, col. 663, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>135</sup> *ibid*, vol. 8, col. 673, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>136</sup> *ibid*, vol. 8, col. 674, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>137</sup> *ibid*, vol. 8, col. 675, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>138</sup> *ibid*, vol. 8, col. 679, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>139</sup> John David Rees (1854–1922) KCIE, CVO. Liberal MP for Montgomery 1906–1910, then Unionist MP for Nottingham East 1912–1922. Had been in the Indian Civil Service 1875–1901, serving mostly in the south of the country where he was Under-Secretary in Madras Government and later British Resident in Travancore



and Cochin. In the 1890s he was an Additional Member of the Governor-General's Council. Translator to the Government of Madras in Hindustani, Persian, Tamil and Telugu. Russian interpreter who held the Order of St. Stanislaus. Newly created Baronetcy of Aylward's Chase 1919–1922. Writings: *Notes of a Journey from Kasveen to Hamadan across the Karaghan Country* [in North Persia] (1885); *Narratives of Tours in India made by His Excellency Lord Connemara GCIE, Governor of Madras 1886–1890* (1891); *H.R.H. the Duke of Clarence & Avondale in Southern India* (1891); *The Muhammadans 1001–1761 A.D.* (1894); Introduction to the *Advice to the Indian Aristocracy* by Venkata Ranga Rao (1905); *India. The Real India* (1908), subsequently several editions, such as Vol. XIX in the 'Oriental Series' (1910); *Modern India* (1910); *Current Political Problems: With Pros and Cons* (1912), etc.

<sup>140</sup> *Hansard*, vol. 8, col. 685, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>141</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 8, col. 684, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>142</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 8, col. 684, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>143</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 8, col. 688, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>144</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 8, col. 691, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>145</sup> Brailsford to Morel, 6<sup>th</sup> September 1906. F9 Folder B, F. 172. E.D. Morel Papers, British Library of Political and Economic Science, L.S.E., London.

<sup>146</sup> *Hansard*, vol. 8, col. 693, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>147</sup> John Dillon (1851–1927), Irish Nationalist MP for Tipperary 1880–1883 when resigned, then East Mayo 1885–1918 when defeated. Supported land reform and Irish Home Rule. Last leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party. See *John Dillon: A biography* (1968) by Francis S.L. Lyons

<sup>148</sup> *Hansard*, vol. 8, col. 701, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>149</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 8, col. 707, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>150</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 8, col. 730, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909.

<sup>151</sup> *ibid.*, vol. 8, col. 729–732, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1909. Division List No. 361.

<sup>152</sup> See 10<sup>th</sup> January 1912, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e617/1, p. 42.

<sup>153</sup> See 27<sup>th</sup> December 1911, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e617/1, p. 34.

<sup>154</sup> See 22<sup>nd</sup> October 1911, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e616/4, p. 83.

<sup>155</sup> See for example: H.F.B. Lynch, *Sir Edward Grey On Persia* (1912). The Persia Committee. Pamphlet No. 2.

<sup>156</sup> See 10<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> January 1912, Nevins Journals, MS Eng. Misc. e617/1, pp. 42 and 45 respectively.

<sup>157</sup> Granville George Greenwood (1850–1928), Sir, Liberal MP for Peterborough 1906–1918 when defeated. Called to Bar by Middle Temple 1876. Supporter of idea of Indian independence. Supported various measures for the protection of animals, even being on the Council of the RSPCA. Published extensively, especially on the question of the identity of Shakespeare: *The Shakespeare Problem Restated* (1908); *In re Shakespeare: Beeching vs Greenwood. Rejoinder on behalf of the defendant* (1909); *The Vindicators of Shakespeare. A reply to critics. Together with some remarks on Dr. Wallace's "New Shakespeare Discoveries."* (1911); *Letters to The Nation and the Literary Guide* (1915–1916); *Is There a Shakespeare Problem?* (1916); *Shakespeare's Law and Latin* (1916); *Shakespeare's Law* (1920); *Shakespeare's Handwriting* (1920); *Ben Johnson and Shakespeare* (1921); *Baconian Essays* (Introduction and two essays, 1922); *Lee, Shakespeare and a Tertium Quid* (1923); *Shakespeare's Signatures and "Sir Thomas More"* (1924); *The Stratford Bust and the Droeshout Engraving* (1925); etc.

<sup>158</sup> Greenwood to Ponsonby, 31<sup>st</sup> July 1914. Jan.–Aug. 1914, MS Eng. Hist. c660, F. 62. Ponsonby Papers.

<sup>159</sup> Wrege, E.R. to Burns, 5<sup>th</sup> August 1914. Br. Mus. Add. MS. 46,303. F. 41–42. Burns Papers. Written on document in pencil: 'an old fellow numbered in 1881 an engineer.'

<sup>160</sup> Fisher to Murray, 7<sup>th</sup> August 1914. 54. F. 234. H.A.L. Fisher Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

<sup>161</sup>Henry Norman, (1858–1939), Sir. Liberal MP for Wolverhampton South 1900–Jan. 1910, then Blackburn Dec. 1910–1923, especially advocating women’s suffrage. Journalist for *Pall Mall Gazette* and *New York Times*. Worked for *Daily Chronicle* 1892–, becoming assistant editor. He established and edited the magazine *The World’s Work*, 1902–1923, utilizing his knowledge derived from his extensive travels in the East. Assistant Postmaster-General 1910. Chairman of the War Office Committee on Wireless Telegraphy 1912. Chairman of the Imperial Wireless Telegraphy Committee 1920, which envisaged linking the British Empire by wireless. Strong supporter of wireless broadcasting. Created Baronet of Honeyhanger in Parish of Shottermill in County of Surrey 1915. Privy Councillor 1918. Appointed a JP for Surrey. Of his writings: *An Account of the Harvard Greek Play* (1881); *The Preservation of Niagara Falls* (1882); *The Real Japan* (1881); *The Peoples and Politics of the Far East: Travels and Studies in the British, French, Spanish and Portuguese Colonies, Siberia, China, Japan, Korea, Siam and Malaya* (1895); *All the Russias: Travels and Studies in Contemporary European Russia, Finland, Siberia, The Caucasus and Central Asia* (1902); *The Treatment and Training of Disabled and Discharged Soldiers in France* [a report] (1917); *Will No Man Understand?* [a play] (1934).

<sup>162</sup>Norman to Burns, 9<sup>th</sup> August 1914. Br. Mus. Add. MS. 46,303. F. 88. Burns Papers.

<sup>163</sup>H.N. Brailsford, *Persia, Finland and our Russian Alliance* (1915), p. 1.

<sup>164</sup>Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, *Our Russian Ally* (1914), p. 3.

<sup>165</sup>*ibid*, p. 17.

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